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Abstract
The chapter provides a brief biography of
Wynne Godley (1926–2010), a British econo-
mist who informed the discussion of economic
policy in the United Kingdom and later the
United States. Godley was the main contribu-
tor to the development of the stock-flow-
consistent approach to macroeconomics, set-
ting out models based on rigorous accounting
which allowed him to anticipate (ahead of
more orthodox forecasters) adverse develop-
ments in the UK economy in the 1970s and
1980s, as well as the global recessions of 2001
and 2007–2009.
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Wynne Godley 1926–2010
The Hon. Wynne Alexander Hugh Godley was
born in London in 1926, the grandson of John
Arthur Godley (who had served as Permanent
Under-Secretary of State for India) and son of
Hugh John Godley, a prominent but erratic lawyer
(Cripps and Lavoie 2017; Shipman 2019). He
studied Philosophy, Politics and Economics at
Oxford, but started his career as an orchestral
musician, after training at the Paris Conservatoire
for 3 years. A lifelong interest in visual arts devel-
oped through his marriage to Kathleen (Kitty)
Garman, ex-wife of Lucian Freud and daughter
of the sculptor Jacob Epstein, whose cast of
Godley’s head became that of St Michael con-
quering the Devil on the wall of the rebuilt Cov-
entry Cathedral.
Godley abandoned a promising career as a
professional oboist due to stage fright and, after
a brief period in industry, was employed in the UK
Treasury in a period (from 1956) when the sys-
tematic collection of macroeconomic data had just
begun. His capacity for short-term forecasting
was quickly recognised by senior Treasury
advisers, notably Nicholas Kaldor (economic
adviser with a special focus on tax from 1964)
and Sir Claus Moser (director of the Central Sta-
tistical Office from 1967). He became expert at
assembling data jealously guarded by the depart-
ments that collected it, and, in a world of slow and
expensive computing, at using the leading indica-
tors to derive sensible GDP, inflation and trade-
balance projections in time for annual budget
preparation.
Painfully aware of how little the Treasury
knew of the precise relationships among key eco-
nomic aggregates, Godley used a 1963–1964
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secondment to the National Institute of Economic
and Social Research (NIESR) to review existing
methods of calculating and forecasting GDP and
simulating effects of policy changes. He
conducted several sector studies of price-setting
to develop the mark-up pricing ideas first acquired
from his Oxford economics tutor Philip Andrews,
especially testing the hypothesis that firms mark-
up prices over cyclically corrected ‘normal’ cost.
The discovery that industrial prices adjust more
slowly than current costs, causing output and pro-
ductivity to fluctuate with aggregate demand, was
refined in later studies with Ken Coutts, Robert
Neild andWilliam Nordhaus (Neild 1963; Godley
and Nordhaus 1972; Coutts et al. 1978), yielding
strong implications for the impact of different
taxes and the effectiveness of fiscal policy for
stabilising output.
Returning to a Treasury at which Neild had
joined Kaldor as an economic adviser after the
Labour Party’s 1964 election win, Godley rose
to be a deputy director, still supervising forecasts
but focusing on major policy interventions. His
most sensitive task was to calculate the size of
pound sterling devaluation (and accompanying
fiscal restriction) needed in 1967, when Labour
belatedly decided this was essential for restoring
external balance without sacrificing full employ-
ment. He also worked on the detail of a number of
Kaldor’s innovative tax schemes, notably the
Selective Employment Tax (SET) designed to
boost investment in manufacturing industries
and regions. The improved economic climate fol-
lowing devaluation gave time to deploy the
Treasury’s improving statistical resources on
empirical tests of theories previously derived
from ‘stylised facts’. These included an investiga-
tion of Verdoorn’s Law (the link between labour
productivity and manufacturing output growth
which had motivated the SET), and an exercise
in ‘growth accounting’ which defended the effec-
tiveness of Treasury fiscal management against
Robin Matthews’ (1968) calculation that private
investment drove post-war recovery.
Recruited as director of the Cambridge Univer-
sity Department of Applied Economics (DAE)
from 1970 by Kaldor, Godley was coldly received
by the neighbouring Faculty of Economics, and
continued to work on short-term economic policy
challenges. He assembled and secured funding for
the Cambridge Economic Policy Group (CEPG),
a team of macro and labour-market researchers
whose quarterly Policy Review gave short-term
forecasts and simulations of alternative policy
impacts. Francis Cripps, who had worked with
Kaldor in the Treasury and resigned his tenured
Faculty post to join the CEPG, led the program-
ming of the computer model and the academic
presentation of its distinct methodology (Cripps
and Godley 1976).
Despite maintaining close connections with it,
Godley clashed with the Treasury on a number of
issues, beginning with the Conservative govern-
ment’s fiscal stimulus of 1973–1974, which he
correctly predicted would end with higher infla-
tion and renewed current-account deterioration.
He led a revolt against the system of real-terms
public expenditure projection, introduced in the
late 1960s to strengthen the Treasury’s control
over multi-year spending programmes, which
actually weakened it during the high early-1970s
inflation (despite attempts at more accurate cost
deflation) and pushed the next Labour govern-
ment towards imposing cash limits. Treasury
trust was further weakened by a very public battle
between Godley’s group and ‘Cambridge Keynes-
ian’ colleagues (led by Richard Kahn andMichael
Posner), fought out on the pages of The Times
newspaper where the CEPG had a regular com-
mentary slot. The dispute arose from Godley’s
re-interpretation of the basic macro-accounting
identity, later defined as the ‘fundamental
identity’:
G Tð Þ þ I Sð Þ ¼ M Xð Þ
in which the current account deficit (roughly
iMports minus eXports) is the ex-post sum of the
public sector deficit (Government spending minus
Tax revenue) and the private sector deficit
(Investment minus Saving). His empirical work
with Cripps suggested that in the UK private
saving (S) had consistently moved along with
private investment (I) throughout the 1960s (and
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for a longer period after abstracting from the tem-
porary displacement of S above I when post-war
pensions schemes were launched). The long-term
stable relation between S and I supported the view
that the private sector’s net acquisition of financial
assets (NAFA) should be stable, with households
and firms targeting a steady ratio of financial
assets to income in real terms.
If NAFA is stable, any fiscal deficit (G > T)
would be matched by a current-account deficit
(M > X). This contradicted the preferred Cam-
bridge view that the private sector tended to over-
save, leading to times when a fiscal deficit was
necessary to preserve full employment and com-
patible with external balance. In the event, the
Labour Government managed to run a higher
deficit in 1974–1975 without dire inflationary or
balance-of-payments consequences, vindicating
those who argued that high inflation would drive
up private-sector saving. This distancing from the
Chancellor, Denis Healey, left Godley’s group
powerless to stop Labour denouncing ‘Keynes-
ian’ fiscal expansion in 1976, and moving in a
monetarist direction after accepting IMF support.
The Conservatives’ return in 1979, inspired by
monetarism to the extent of imposing further pub-
lic spending cuts in 1981 in the depths of a reces-
sion sparked by their restrictive 1979–1980
budgets, ended Godley’s direct engagement with
policymaking. But it re-united Cambridge econo-
mists, who rallied behind the nationwide cam-
paign to restore a Keynesian approach to the
re-emerging mass unemployment, and gave
Godley the time and incentive for a more funda-
mental re-assessment of textbook and Treasury
macroeconomics.
Several important features of Godley’s
reconceptualisation were already present by
1983, when he and Cripps co-wrote Macroeco-
nomics (Godley and Cripps 1983) for a series
edited by Kings College colleague Frank
Kermode. There was full stock-flow consistency,
with the full impacts of expenditure changes
traced through a national economy (and briefly
extended to an open economy) using the newly
available device of personal computer simula-
tions. Money was endogenous, created by
private-sector lending even without the presence
of government. The analysis began with monetary
flows, drawing immediate attention to the credit
financing of production and borrowers’ need to
keep financing their debt. It supplied a system of
inflation accounting that could calibrate the sector
balance approach with real historical data, and
allow an exploration of the stock-flow ratios that
might affect the system’s adjustment. However,
the book’s innovations were obscured by its
abstract approach. The book received a lukewarm
reception from other macroeconomists even in
Cambridge, and baffled most general readers.
Godley’s efforts to rectify these problems
through a revised edition of the book were
derailed when the UK Social Science Research
Council (SSRC, later renamed ESRC) withdrew
funding from his main DAE project, agreeing
only to continue smaller-scale Europe-focused
work by Cripps and forcing the CEPG to disperse.
Although the DAE continued to expand and
reached its peak external funding under Godley’s
directorship, the SSRC was more committed to
the adjacent Cambridge Growth Project (CGP)
launched by Sir Richard Stone and by 1983 led
by Terry Barker and Terry Ward. It was also
determined to scale down recurrent funding for
macroeconomic model teams in general, by mak-
ing them exploit opportunities to sell forecast
reports and bespoke consultancy to government
or business customers. The CGP successfully
launched Cambridge Econometrics, while Ward
joined Cripps in launching the Alphametrics
consultancy.
Criticisms of his work by SSRC referees forced
Godley to look more closely at the central con-
cepts of mainstream macroeconomics (general
equilibrium, real business cycles, rational expec-
tations) and the econometric models that were
being built around them. Their lack of realism –
particularly in conducting analysis entirely in ‘real’
terms before eventually introducing an exogenous
money to set the absolute price level, and extending
a short-term analysis into the longer term without
tracing through the stock effects of investment and
credit flows – reinforced his belief that startingwith
sector balances and working downwards to
behavioural patterns within sectors would shed
more light on the macroeconomy than building
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up from a rarefied model of households and firms
making optimising choices under income con-
straints. Existing approaches wilfully neglected
the obvious accounting requirements for every
asset to have a corresponding liability (which
needed to be financed), and every inflow to one
sector to be matched by an outflow from another.
While looking for echoes of this dissent around
the world, and finding them particularly in James
Tobin’s Yale group of economists linking macro-
economics to modern financial theory, Godley
refined his critique and began setting out an alter-
native based on the systematic analysis of stock-
flow relationships across the public, private,
financial and international sectors. He worked
directly with a small group of DAE colleagues
(notably Ken Coutts, Graham Gudgin and
Michael Anyadike-Danes) and by long-running
correspondence with former Treasury colleague
Bryan Hopkin, now at Cardiff University. He
steered collaboration between the DAE and the
Faculty on macro-related policy issues, notably
the project on de-industrialisation led by Ajit
Singh, John Wells and Bob Rowthorn (Singh
1977; Rowthorn and Wells 1987).
Rowthorn’s conflict theory of inflation
(Rowthorn 1977), depicting a distributive battle
between employers and organised labour which
may cause a wage-price spiral if productivity
growth slows, resonated with Godley’s mark-up
pricing approach. Rejecting any mechanical con-
nection between upward wage or price pressure
and labour-market tightness, Godley argued
throughout his career that full employment and
price stability could co-exist, with no need to
assume a lasting ‘Phillips Curve’ trade-off or
infer the need for incomes policy. United in
gloom over prospects for the UK’s social cohesion
as it slid back into mass unemployment, Godley
and Rowthorn also formalised the dynamics of
public debt (Godley and Rowthorn 1994), identi-
fying the relation between its real interest rate and
the real GDP growth rate in setting the fiscal
deficit (or surplus) consistent with a stable ratio
of debt to national income.
The 1970s ‘stable NAFA’ dispute made
Godley aware of the ways that his attention to
essential stock-flow ratios (in this case of assets
to income) could create a view of the macro-
economy which differed from that of flow-
focused Keynesians as well as neoclassical theo-
rists who dismissed Keynes as a special case of
short-term wage, price or expectational rigidities.
Godley handed on the DAE directorship in 1988,
and dropped from public view until unexpectedly
invited back to the Treasury in 1992 as one of the
Chancellor’s new Panel of Economic Advisers.
The appointment was a backhanded reward for
correctly forecasting the course of events in
1990–1992, when the pound’s entry into the
European exchange-rate mechanism at an unreal-
istically high rate had widened the trade deficit,
plunged the economy into recession, and forced a
severe devaluation to rescue the economy from
absurdly high interest rates.
Although panellists were selected for their vari-
ety of views, the government’s reluctance to raise
interest rates as devaluation revived growth led
Godley to find some common ground with the
more monetarist members, whose attention to the
sources of money and financial sector complexity
he had always respected. His stock-flow-consistent
modelling approach was now attracting particular
interest from policymakers in small economies
with heavy exposure to trade and financial flows,
highlighted by a commission to build a model of
the Danish economy for the country’s central bank.
His interest in balance sheets, which revealed the
need for continuously financing assets and the dif-
ficulty of doing so when their values fell, also led
him to begin contact in the early 1990s with the
Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in
upstate New York, where Hyman Minsky had
also moved.
Around this period, Godley (1992) wrote a
prescient critique of the rules devised in the Maas-
tricht Treaty for European Monetary Union, not-
ing that giving up fiscal and exchange rate policy
at the domestic level – without creating European
institutions to ensure appropriate automatic
stabilisers – would make the Eurozone prone to
instability and deflation. His positions were
refined more formally later, in Godley and Lavoie
(2007a), and provided an insightful presentation
of the causes of the “sovereign debt crisis” of the
2010s in the Eurozone.
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While in the United States, Godley continued
to develop his stock-flow-consistent methodology
as a coherent theoretical framework, while at the
same time developing a model for the US econ-
omy, grounded in his approach to the three-sector
fundamental identity. The first application of this
model was published in Godley (1999), where he
presciently warned that the rising indebtedness of
the private sector would have precipitated a crisis,
which indeed materialised in 2001. In the follow-
ing years, Godley pointed out, in a number of
Levy Institute Strategic Analyses, that the recov-
ery in the US economy was again based on rising
indebtedness, and therefore deemed to end
abruptly. After the Great Recession of 2007, his
contribution was listed among the few who pre-
dicted it timely (Bezemer 2010; Schlefer 2013).
In 2002 Godley returned to Cambridge, invited
by Lord (John) Eatwell to join the Cambridge
Endowment for Research in Finance. Continuing
his association with the Levy Institute, Godley
also started to work with Marc Lavoie from the
University of Ottawa, who proved to be the per-
fect co-author to complete his lifelong project of
publishing a book for popularising his methodol-
ogy in a robust and coherent framework. The
outcome, Monetary Economics (Godley and
Lavoie 2007b), ‘integrates, in the context of a
dynamic stock flow model with watertight
accounting, money and credit creation with the
income/expenditure process, with assets allocated
according to Tobinesque principles’ (Godley
2000: 238). With analyses and simulations of a
series of institutionally realistic models, with real
and financial transactions fully accounted for and
behaviour governed by key stock-flow ratios, this
finally delivered the reformulation of Keynesian
macroeconomics first attempted in his 1983 book
with Cripps.
Helped by the online availability of its main
models (translated from Godley’s idiosyncratic
programming by Gennaro Zezza),Monetary Eco-
nomics quickly became the main reference for the
growing literature on stock-flow-consistent model-
ling. As well as providing a platform for analysing
and resolving numerous post-Keynesian debates
over the behaviour of financialised, internationally
connected economies, stock-flow-consistent models
found an immediate application in ecological eco-
nomics, with the addition of natural asset stocks and
ecosystem service flows (Jackson and Victor 2015;
Dafermos et al. 2017).
Alongside his academic work, even when
deeply immersed in theoretical refinement or
model development, Godley kept up a continual
stream of press and occasional broadcast com-
mentary on the conjunctural state of the European
and American economies. He also sparked a rev-
olution in psychoanalytical practice by reporting
his experiences with the prominent analyst Masud
Khan (Godley 2001). In deteriorating health while
visiting his daughter Eve in Northern Ireland,
Godley remained there with her family until his
death in 2010.
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